Logistics Just Changed Categories in Military Doctrine. That Should Matter to Supply Chain Professionals.

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June 5 , 2026  |  By Matt Waller

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This article was originally published on LinkedIn.

Confirmation documents are not where you go looking for a thesis. They are written to survive scrutiny, not to make a point. The answers hedge, the commitments defer to the Secretary and the President, and the prose is engineered to give nothing away. So when something sharp shows up in one, it is worth reading carefully.

There is a sharp sentence in the advance policy questions submitted for General Dan Caine's confirmation as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  It is in the contested logistics section, in the answer to question 228, and it should matter to anyone who studies supply chains.

Caine writes that logistics "was once considered an enabling function" but that "it has always been one of the six warfighting functions, and now it is clearly a pacing function," adding that all analytic and experimentation efforts must be logistics-informed because the ability to sustain the force underwrites everything else.

Read that again, because the category change is the whole story.

What "pacing function" actually means

In supply chain terms, a pacing function is the constraint that sets the tempo of the entire system. An enabling function supports the plan. A pacing function determines what the plan can be. Moving logistics from the first category to the second is not a rhetorical upgrade or a courtesy to the logisticians in the room. It changes the order of operations in planning. If logistics enables, you build the operational concept and then check whether you can sustain it. If logistics paces, sustainment feasibility is an input to the concept, not an audit performed after the concept is fixed.

Anyone who has worked on commercial supply networks recognizes this distinction immediately, because we have watched it play out in the other direction. For decades, firms treated logistics as the thing that happened after strategy. The ones that learned to treat flow as the constraint that shapes strategy, rather than the cost center that absorbs it, are the ones that are still here.

The vocabulary is the signal

The interesting thing about the rest of Caine's testimony is how consistently it speaks in supply chain language without announcing that it is doing so. He returns repeatedly to throughput, responsiveness, and agility. He states plainly that the acquisition process and the Defense Industrial Base are not optimized for protracted conflict, and that the United States does not currently have the throughput, responsiveness, or agility needed to deter. On the technology questions, his recurring concern is that industry receives a clear demand signal so it knows what to build and at what capacity.

The Defense Industrial Base is a supply network, and it has every pathology that any supply network has: bullwhip, capacity rigidity, long and brittle lead times, and a chronic sensitivity to the quality of the demand signal it receives. Caine's framing treats it that way, which is the correct way to treat it.

Note: The image used in this post was AI generated.

Matt Waller

Matthew A. Waller is dean emeritus of the Sam M. Walton College of Business and professor of supply chain management. His work as a professor, researcher, and consultant is synergistic, blending academic research with practical insights from industry experience. This continuous cycle of learning and application makes his work more effective, relevant, and impactful.

His goals include contributing to academia through high-quality research and publications, cultivating the next generation of professionals through excellent teaching, and creating value for the organizations he consults by optimizing their strategy and investments.